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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CYNTHIA DRIVER, 
Petitioner 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE 
FINANCING, 
Respondent 
REPLY BRIEF 
ARGUMENT 
I. Driver's Argument on Appeal is Not About Substantial Evidence 
The Respondent, Division of Health Care Financing (DHCF), 
misses the point of Driver's argument on appeal. DHCF begins its 
response by asserting that Driver claims the denial of coverage 
"was not supported by substantial evidence." Brief of the 
Appellee, at 11. Nowhere in her brief does Driver argue for 
reversal on the basis of insubstantial evidence. Later, DHCF 
asserts that Driver failed to marshall the evidence to show that 
coverage should have been allowed. Brief of the Appellee, at 12. 
Driver is not challenging a finding of fact, so there was no need 
to marshall evidence. 
The facts in this appeal are not in dispute. The facts are 
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quite simple: Driver was taken by ambulance to the McKay Dee 
Emergency Room where emergency medical services were provided to 
save her life following an attempted suicide. She was later 
admitted to the hospital and, prior to discharge, was given the 
diagnosis of bipolar disorder. Both parties agree these facts 
were established. They differ as to the application of the facts 
to the established law. 
DHCF does not deny that the services provided Driver were to 
save her life, not to treat her underlying mental impairment. 
That being so, DHCF should have addressed why Rule R420-l-2(10) 
was not followed. As Driver pointed out in her opening brief, 
the Rule says that the "Principal diagnosis at discharge" is the 
main medical problem, "based on the best information available." 
DHCF fails to address the fact that Driver was treated with life-
saving measures, not psychotherapy or psychotropic medications, 
which would normally be provided to treat a mental impairment. 
That being so, the best information available establishes that 
the relevant diagnosis for UMAP coverage was "attempted suicide," 
not "bipolar disorder." 
DHCF defends its actions by saying that UMAP representatives 
could not be expected to "independently go in search of and 
obtain information on a particular patient's condition and 
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treatment." Brief of Appellee, at 16. DHCF did not have to go 
far to determine the true cause of Driver's admission. That 
information was readily available to UMAP officials. It is 
specious to suggest, as DHCF does, that Driver should have 
introduced additional evidence to support her eligibility. 
DHCF further clouds the issue by suggesting that Driver's 
condition at admission was the same as it was when discharged. 
Brief of the Appellee, at 17. It notes that at the time of 
admission Driver exhibited "marked behaviors of mental distress," 
symptoms it argues were consistent with her discharge diagnosis. 
What DHCF fails to grasp is that the admission symptoms were 
recorded in the context of a life-threatening suicide attempt, 
while those on discharge were recorded after the patient's life 
had been saved. 
In sum, Driver's appeal is not about substantial evidence 
but about how a reasonable person should view the evidence. DHCF 
faults Driver for not submitting more evidence. What further 
evidence was needed? The emergency room medical personnel knew 
that Driver's life was in danger from a drug overdose. Further 
evidence was not needed to establish that fact. The threat to 
Driver's life was real and not questioned by UMAP officials. No 
amount of obfuscation can obscure that fact. 
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DLICL*' responds to Driver's argument that UMAP rules 
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iiuiL placed on that discretion by the 
Legislature is that UMAP ±s to < - y 
services. DHCF defined medically necessary as referring to acute 
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, .
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-
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specifically rejected. DHCF has not shown how excluding self-
inflicted injuries is consistent with its expressed intent to 
implement the UMAP statute by covering acute and life-threatening 
conditions. 
DHCF's argument by analogy at pages 21 to 2 3 that the 
exclusion of coverage for self-inflicted injuries is like the 
exclusion of coverage for pre-existing conditions in insurance 
contracts misses the mark. A state-mandated medical program for 
the indigent is not like a contract negotiated between an 
insurance company and its insured. Driver and similarly situated 
UMAP clients have no bargaining power to negotiate a contract. 
In its desire to justify its position in this case, DHCF has lost 
sight of its own purpose which is to provide medical care to the 
poorest of the poor, not to act like a tight-fisted insurance 
company intent on denying coverage whenever possible. 
III. DHCF Has Failed To Show The Reasonableness Of Its Policy 
In defense of the constitutionality of its policy denying 
coverage for self-inflicted injuries, DHCF asserts: "Applying the 
exclusions provision in this case is not arbitrary. It is the 
logical result of line-drawing in the coverage of services." 
Brief of the Appellee, at 31. If DHCF's policy is logical, where 
is the demonstrated logic? The appellee does not attempt to 
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convince tht r 111 n n i 11 i in\ i HHJH ai 11 -imply asserts 
th-;t it. is 3no expects triu conclusion to be accepted witnout 
pi „: _:\L. : ow.jru.nq tha4- *: policy is not arbitrary does not 
make it so. 
The UMAP rules start with the premise thdt o.i.re-threatening 
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:nt~ her system. When treated . ~ t;:e i^_ emergency room, Lue 
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from a bipolar disorder and acu , 
the presence of a "psychiatric" condition -bipolar disorder-
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objectives of the UMAP program. It has not shown what legitimate 
state interest is served by allowing coverage in one class of 
cases—trauma inflicted by an independent cause—and denying 
coverage when the trauma is self-inflicted. 
CONCLUSION 
Driver does not dispute that UMAP is a limited program and 
that not all medical services can be covered. She does not 
challenge the UMAP rule which denies coverage for "psychiatric" 
conditions. Thus, Driver would not seek to have psychotherapy or 
psychotropic medications covered, if they were prescribed as a 
treatment for her bipolar disorder. But Driver was not in need 
of therapy or medication when she was taken to the emergency 
room. She needed emergency treatment for a life-threatening 
condition which reasonably must be covered by UMAP. To hold 
otherwise is contrary to UMAP rules, the state UMAP statute and 
the Utah Constitution. 
DATED this ^ L y of July, 2001. 
ichael E. Bulson 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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